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Marx is dead. Long live Marx. Such a slogan still has appeal even in the aftermath of 
the breakup of the Soviet Union, the jarring political transformations in Eastern Europe, 
and the attendant crises these have provoked within almost every strand of Marxian 
theory. Marx's own time was similarly marked by a series of turbulent social, political, 
and economic upheavals, all of which helped shape and produce Marxism. So it should 
come as little surprise that this newest wave of global crises has spurred renewed 
interest in Marxism, in its origins, and in its continued contemporary relevance. In his 
1999 Cambridge University Press book, Marx, the Young Hegelians, and the Origins of 
Radical Social Theory: Dethroning the Self, Warren Breckman provides us with a post-
Marxist intellectual history of pre-Marxist social and political thought. Favoring a more 
nuanced account of the relationship between the overtly political writings of the young 
Marx and the more theologically oriented Young Hegelians, Breckman emphasizes the 
continuities and shared concerns that exist between the two rather than their more 
commonly highlighted disparities.  
For Breckman, the debates concerning civil society within German philosophy during 
the 1830s and early 1840s are deeply embedded in both political and theological 
contexts. As he writes, "the constellation of concerns involved in the question of civil 
society—the relationship between society and the state, individual and community, 
economics and politics, the private person and the public citizen, self-interest and 
altruism—were intimately tied to religious questions" (4-5). Breckman finds fresh 
relevance for this history in the current debates over civil society and its progressive 
possibilities for democratic politics. The author takes as his point of departure the 
concept of "personality," particularly as it is encountered in arguments for and against 
various versions of "Christian personalism" in debates surrounding Hegel. Breckman 
argues that this concept provides a link between theological and political disputes such 
that: "The Young Hegelians' rejection of Christian personalism thus furnishes us with a 
key to understanding their revolt against religion, monarchy, and bourgeois civil society" 
(10). It is against this background that Breckman traces the development of Marx's 
earliest theories.  
The book begins with a discussion of Hegel's conservative theological critics, whose 
concerns tended to focus on Hegel's supposed pantheism. Breckman traces a line of 
argument stretching from the critique of rationalist theology in F. H. Jacobi through the 
vicissitudes of F. W. Schelling's Positive Philosophy to the anti-Hegelian political 
theology of Julius Stahl and connects these critics to various forms of personalism. In 
every case, as an antidote to the perceived excesses of Hegel's philosophy where 
Christianity seemed in danger of being swallowed up by the inexorable movement of the 
Hegelian dialectic, "Hegel's opponents all sought to recover the 'living,' 'free,' 'actual,' 
'personal' God" (42). For Stahl, this return to personalism served not only to shore up 
more traditional Protestant theology, but also to support his reactionary political theories 
for the restoration of the Prussian monarchy and against the wave of democratic 
republicanism which had swept across Europe in the wake of the French Revolution. 
Thus, Hegel's rationalism was seen as a threat not only to orthodox religion but to 
orthodox politics as well. Breckman argues that the conservative response to Hegel was 
an attempt to place both religious authority and political authority firmly back into the 
hands of a personal God and a personal monarch.  
Hegel's more radical critics also had their discontents with the Hegelian system. 
Breckman offers a novel reading of Ludwig Feuerbach's early theological and 
philosophical works in this context as simultaneously constituting a social and political 
critique of what he terms "Christian civil society" (90 ff.). Breckman argues that 
Feuerbach came to view Christian personalism in particular, and Protestantism in 
general, as sources of a socially divisive individualism. Thus, Feuerbach saw his task as 
the liberation of politics from the pernicious influence of Christianity. In an 1828 letter to 
Hegel, Feuerbach wrote that, "it is a question of overthrowing from its throne the ego, 
the self in general, which, especially since the beginning of Christianity, has dominated 
the world, which has conceived itself as the only spirit to exist" (1). Breckman argues 
that the roots of Young Hegelian radical social theory can be found in two principle 
sources. The first lies in the politically charged battles occasioned by David Strauss' 
controversial use of Hegel in his 1835 book The Life of Jesus. This event had a 
galvanizing effect on both "Left" and "Right" Hegelians and transformed an otherwise 
esoteric theological dispute into a political debate on the legitimacy of the Christian 
Prussian State and of the Prussian monarchy. The second source can be traced to the 
German reception of French social theory. In particular, Breckman argues that the 
Christian socialism of Saint-Simonianism injected a new concern for social issues into 
German theology and philosophy. Coupled with the growing poverty of a large segment 
of the population, Saint-Simonian ideas resonated both with German social conditions 
as well as with Young Hegelian critiques of personalist theology. Breckman pursues 
these themes through close readings of Eduard Gans, Marx's Hegelian political 
philosophy professor at the University of Berlin; the social theologies of Heinrich Heine, 
Moses Hess, and August Cieszkowski; Ludwig Feuerbach (with a plausible, if 
somewhat speculative, account of possible Saint-Simonian influences on his work); and 
a chapter on Arnold Ruge, one the most politically engaged of the Young Hegelians.  
The final chapter of this book focuses on Karl Marx and the ways in which his early work 
fits into the overlapping contexts provided by the religious, social, philosophical, and 
political concerns of the Young Hegelians. Breckman argues that Marx's critiques of 
individualism and bourgeois civil society are best understood as emerging from his 
engagement with the Young Hegelian critiques of political theology in general, and 
Christian personalism in particular, rather than from any systematic critique of political 
liberalism. Breckman finds support for this claim in Marx's very early college writings 
and dissertation but especially in his 1843 essays "Critique of Hegel's Philosophy of 
Law" and "On the Jewish Question." Breckman writes that in the first essay Marx takes 
as his target not just the modern bureaucratic state and private property, but also the 
personal monarch such that: "If sovereignty exists as the private right of the monarch, 
then sovereignty is private property, and private property is sovereign. Sovereignty and 
private property stand or fall together by virtue of the idea of transcendent personhood" 
(289). In the second essay, Marx then "completed the transfer of his analysis of 
Christian personalism from the monarch to the postrevolutionary liberal state," arguing 
that the emancipation of politics from religion and the freeing of individuals from the 
realm of civil society and their transformation into citizens of the state was insufficient 
for true human freedom (291).  
Writing an intellectual history of Karl Marx is always a vexing endeavor since Marx's 
own theories of historical materialism and ideology tend to militate against the possibility 
of such a project. However, perhaps Marx paid too little heed to the material aspects of 
ideological production. The writings of the Young Hegelians did not take place only in 
the mind, but also in a context that included the censorship and arrest of professors 
such as the Göttingen Seven, and within very real academic labor histories including 
political intrigues over teaching appointments and stipends that contributed to Marx's 
loss of an academic career and his subsequent exile and poverty. These constitute 
material conditions even by Marx's standards. Breckman's history sheds welcome light 
on these events and rehabilitates a crucial line of intellectual debate formative for Marx's 
early thought. However, there are moments when Breckman seems less than 
sympathetic to Marxian theory. For instance, in writing on pauperism in Germany in the 
1830s, Breckman states: "It is now generally agreed that the economic source of this 
acute crisis lay in too little, not too much, industrialization" (149). This general 
agreement probably does not extend to many Marxists for whom Marx's analysis of 
rising unemployment as a predictable consequence of capitalism remains as salient 
today as in 1830. This is particularly true given the ongoing economic crises in the Third 
World and World Bank policies which continue to see capital not as the cause but as the 
cure.  
Similarly, Breckman may overstate the degree of "consensus" that currently exists 
among scholars with regard to "the shortcomings of Marx's critique of civil society" (2). 
Breckman quotes Michel Foucault from The History of Sexuality who writes that, "the 
representation of power has remained under the spell of monarchy. In political thought 
and analysis, we still have not cut off the head of the king" (302). However, the revival of 
civil society as a category of analysis and its crowning as a "normative ideal," something 
Breckman endorses, may be yet another way of avoiding this regicide (2). Conversely, 
Breckman may understate the distance that separates various post-Marxist theorists. 
For instance, while it may be true as Breckman states that Jean L. Cohen and Andrew 
Arato in their book Civil Society and Political Theory seek to retrieve a normative 
concept of civil society as a way around current impasses in political theory, this could 
not be truly said of many poststructuralist post-Marxist critics such Jacques Derrida in 
his Specters of Marx. However, some of these poststructuralist theorists might fit into 
what Breckman sees as a general return to Hegel. In Slavoj Zizek's book The Ticklish 
Subject: The Absent Centre of Political Ontology, also published in 1999, Zizek pursues 
the characteristically perverse and idiosyncratic project of a manifesto of Cartesian 
subjectivity. For the first third of the book he does this through an exploration of the self 
as articulated within German Idealism, especially in Hegel. This same interest in Hegel 
can also be found in the even more recent book by Judith Butler, Ernesto Laclau and 
Slavoj Zizek entitled Contingency, Hegemony, Universality: Contemporary Dialogues on 
the Left. In these books, the project is not the restoration of a normative civil society, but 
both are animated by an appreciation of the power and relevance of Hegel even for 
current poststructuralist political theories. Thus, Breckman is certainly right to insist that 
the view of the self matters crucially for political philosophy, and that contemporary 
debates within post-Marxism often hinge on just such questions concerning the self. 
Given this, Breckman's book is a timely retelling of those earlier debates surrounding 
the self which so decisively shaped nineteenth-century European political thought and 
which have special relevance today as the lines of debate are redrawn for the twenty-
first century.  
 
